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The MIKEY-SAKKE protocol is being promoted by the UK gov-
ernment as a better way to secure phone calls. The reality is that
MIKEY-SAKKE is designed to offer minimal security while allowing
undetectable mass surveillance, through the introduction a backdoor
based around mandatory key-escrow. This weakness has implications
which go further than just the security of phone calls.
The current state of security for phone calls leaves
a lot to be desired. Land-line calls are almost entirely unen-
crypted, and cellphone calls are also unencrypted except for the
radio link between the handset and the phone network. While the
latest cryptography standards for cellphones (3G and 4G) are rea-
sonably strong it is possible to force a phone to fall back to older
standards with easy-to-break cryptography, if any. The vast major-
ity of phones will not reveal to their user whether such an attack is
under way.
The only reason that eavesdropping on land-line calls is not com-
monplace is that getting access to the closed phone networks is not
as easy compared to the more open Internet, and cellphone cryptog-
raphy designers relied on the equipment necessary to intercept the
radio link being only affordable by well-funded government intel-
ligence agencies, and not by criminals or for corporate espionage.
That might have been true in the past but it certainly no longer
the case with the necessary equipment now available for $1,5001. 1 Kristin Paget, “Practical Cellphone
Spying”, blog post, 2010, http://www.
tombom.co.uk/blog/?p=262
Governments, companies and individuals are increasingly looking
for better security.
A second driver for better phone call encryption is the con-
vergence of Internet and phone networks. The LTE (Long-Term
Evolution) 4G cellphone standard – under development by the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) – carries voice calls over IP
packets, and desktop phones in companies are increasingly carrying
voice over IP (VoIP) too. Because voice calls may travel over the In-
ternet, whatever security was offered by the closed phone networks
is gone and so other security mechanisms are needed.
Like Internet data encryption, voice encryption can broadly be
categorised as either link encryption, where each intermediary
may encrypt data before passing it onto the next, or end-to-end en-
cryption, where communications are encrypted such that only the
legitimate end-points can have access to the unencrypted commu-
nication. End-to-end encryption is preferable for security because
it avoids intermediaries being able to eavesdrop on communica-
tions and gives the end-points assurance that communications
will indeed be encrypted all the way to their other communication
partner.
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Current cellphone encryption standards are link encryption:
the phone encrypts calls between it and the phone network using
cryptographic keys stored on the Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM). Within the phone network, encryption may also be present
but the network provider still has access to unencrypted data, so
even ignoring the vulnerability to fall-back attacks on the radio
link, the network providers and their suppliers are weak points
that are tempting for attackers to compromise. Recent examples
of such attacks include the compromise of the phone networks
of Vodafone in Greece (2004)2 and Belgacom in Belgium (2012)3, 2 Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis
Spinellis, “The Athens Affair”, IEEE
Spectrum, 2007, http://spectrum.
ieee.org/telecom/security/the-
athens-affair
3 Ryan Gallagher, “Operation So-
cialist”, The Intercept, 2014, https:
//theintercept.com/2014/12/13/
belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
and the SIM card supplier Gemalto in France (2010)4. The identity
4 Jeremy Scahill and Josh Begley, “The
Great SIM Heist”, The Intercept, 2015,
https://theintercept.com/2015/02/
19/great-sim-heist/
of the Vodafone Greece hacker remains unknown (though the
NSA is suspected5) but the attacks against Belgacom and Gemalto
5 James Bamford, “A Death in
Athens”, The Intercept, 2015, https://
theintercept.com/2015/09/28/death-
athens-rogue-nsa-operation/
were carried out by the UK signals intelligence agency – GCHQ –
and only publicly revealed from the Snowden leaks, so it is quite
possible there are others attacks which remain hidden.
Email is typically only secured by link encryption, if at all, with
HTTPS encrypting access to most webmail and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) sometimes encrypting other communication proto-
cols that carry email (SMTP, IMAP and POP). Again, the fact that
intermediaries have access to plaintext creates a vulnerability, as
demonstrated by the 2009 hack of Google’s Gmail6 likely origi-
6 David Drummond, “A new approach
to China”, Google, 2010, https:
//googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2010/
01/new-approach-to-china.html
nating from China. End-to-end email encryption is possible using
the OpenPGP or S/MIME protocols but their use is not common,
primarily due to their poor usability, which in turn is at least par-
tially a result of having to stay compatible with older insecure email
standards.
In contrast, instant messaging applications had more opportu-
nity to start with a clean-slate (because there is no expectation of
compatibility among different networks) and so this is where much
innovation in terms of end-to-end security has taken place. Secure
voice communication however has had less attention than instant
messaging so in the remainder of the article we shall examine what
should be expected of a secure voice communication system, and
in particular see how one of the latest and up-coming protocols,
MIKEY-SAKKE7, which comes with UK government backing, meets 7 Michael Groves, MIKEY-SAKKE:
Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY),
RFC 6509, IETF, 2012
these criteria.
MIKEY-SAKKE and Secure Chorus
MIKEY-SAKKE is the security protocol behind the Secure Chorus8 8 CESG, “Secure Voice at OFFICIAL”,
White paper, 2015, http://www.cesg.
gov.uk/guidance/secure-voice-
official
voice (and also video) encryption standard, commissioned and
designed by GCHQ through their information security arm, CESG.
GCHQ have announced that they will only certify voice encryption
products through their Commercial Product Assurance (CPA)9 9 CESG, “Secure Real-Time Com-
munications Gateway”, CPA Se-
curity Characteristic, 2015, https:
//www.cesg.gov.uk/documents/cpa-
security-characteristic-secure-
real-time-communications-gateway
security evaluation scheme if the product implements MIKEY-
SAKKE and Secure Chorus. As a result, MIKEY-SAKKE has a
monopoly over the vast majority of classified UK government
voice communication and so companies developing secure voice
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communication systems must implement it in order to gain access
to this market. GCHQ can also set requirements of what products
are used in the public sector and as well as for companies operating
critical national infrastructure.
UK government standards are also influential in guiding pur-
chase decisions outside of government and we are already seeing
MIKEY-SAKKE marketed commercially as “government-grade
security”10 and capitalising on their approval for use in the UK gov- 10 http://www.armourcomms.com/
solutions/ernment. For this reason, and also because GCHQ have provided
implementers a free open source library11 to make it easier and 11 https://bitbucket.org/
securechorus/cheaper to deploy Secure Chorus, we can expect wide use MIKEY-
SAKKE in industry and possibly among the public. It is therefore
important to consider whether MIKEY-SAKKE is appropriate for
wide-scale use. For the reasons outlined in the remainder of this
article, the answer is no – MIKEY-SAKKE is designed to offer mini-
mal security while allowing undetectable mass surveillance though
key-escrow, not to provide effective security.
The EFF scorecard12 gives a summary of some important secu- 12 https://www.eff.org/secure-
messaging-scorecardrity features for the diverse range of instant messaging applications
and networks, so these serve as a useful starting point to develop
security requirements of voice encryption.
1. Is your communication encrypted along all the links in the communica-
tion path?
If the encryption is removed at any point, for example at the
network provider for cellphone conversations, this creates a weak
link and so should be avoided.
2. Is your communication encrypted with a key the provider doesn’t have
access to?
This criterion differentiates link encryption (which can meet
the first criterion) from end-to-end encryption where only the
communication partners have access to the unencrypted content.
If this criterion is met, the communication can be secure even if
the network provider’s computers are compromised.
3. Can you independently verify your correspondent’s identity?
It important to know who you are communicating with so as to
prevent a “man in the middle” attack where the two partners
think their communications are end-to-end encrypted when
actually there is an eavesdropper who is removing the encryp-
tion, examining (or modifying) the unencrypted content then
re-encrypting it before passing it on (see Figure 1). This crite-
rion is only met if any such attack can be detected, even if the
network provider’s computers are compromised.
4. Are past communications secure if your keys are stolen?
Like the network provider, the computers used by the commu-
nication partners themselves are also subject to attack and the
cryptographic keys they store may be compromised. This cri-
terion states that should a key compromise occur, through use
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Alice
Man in the Middle
Bob
intended communication path
actual communication path
Figure 1: Alice thinks her communi-
cation with Bob is encrypted securely,
but actually a man-in-the-middle is
eavesdropping on the conversation.
of forward-secure cryptography, past communications must
remain secure and only conversations started after the key was
compromised will be vulnerable.
5. Is the code open to independent review?
6. Is the crypto design well-documented?
7. Has there been an independent security audit?
The final three criteria are on whether the implementation (5)
and design (6) can be reviewed, and whether they actually have
been reviewed (7).
Whether these seven criteria are the best ones to evaluate a
product is an ongoing debate, but they are based on years of expe-
rience of using instant messaging tools in hostile environments and
are representative of some of the ways by which communication
security is breached in practice. In particular, a common thread
throughout the criteria is a recognition that generally breaches
occur as a result of flaws in the security protocol design, and par-
ticularly software implementations, rather than the underlying
cryptographic algorithms.
Robust systems try to minimise the number of components
which are in a position to break a user’s security, such as the opera-
tor of the communication links (criteria 1 and 3) or the provider of
the network (criterion 2). Robust systems should then try to build
confidence in the security, of the design and implementation, of the
remaining components which must be relied upon (criteria 5, 6 and
7). Finally, when compromises do happen the damage should be
limited (criterion 4).
Key exchange for voice encryption
To assess MIKEY-SAKKE against these and other criteria we need
to explore more detail of how the security protocol works. MIKEY-
SAKKE extends the Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)13 stan- 13 Jari Arkko, et al., MIKEY: Multimedia
Internet KEYing, RFC 3830, IETF, 2004dard, designed for voice and video encryption, by using Sakai-
Kasahara Key Encryption (SAKKE)14. MIKEY just focusses on the 14 Michael Groves, Sakai-Kasahara Key
Encryption (SAKKE), RFC 6508, IETF,
2012
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most difficult part of secure communications – establishing a cryp-
tographic key, using historically slow asymmetric cryptography –
and leaves the actual job of encrypting communications with fast
symmetric cryptography under the session key that was established,
for implementers to select. The Secure Chorus standards however
recommend the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) with a 128 bit key size, which is a widely
used and efficient standard considered sufficiently secure for almost
any purpose.
All the variants of MIKEY, and key-exchange algorithms in
general, aim to ensure that at the completion of the protocol the
legitimate communication partners share a session key that is not
feasible for anyone else to infer. MIKEY supports the Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman (EDH) algorithm, which is widely used when
both communication partners are online at the same time. The
two communication partners each generate a random number
using a cryptographic random number generator, and send this
in encrypted form to each other. Then, using their own random
number and the encrypted form of their partner’s random number,
each will be able to compute exactly the same session key. However,
someone eavesdropping on the exchange will not be able to guess
the key, even if they later compromise the computers of either or
both of the communication partners.
EDH therefore allows the creation of systems secure against
eavesdropping (meeting criteria 1 and 2), and offers forward secu-
rity (criterion 4), but it is not itself resistant to man-in-the-middle
attacks (criterion 3) because the attacker could perform a separate
EDH exchange with each partner and so learn both keys. There-
fore, EDH exchanges are usually digitally signed with a long-term
asymmetric key to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks while still
offering forward-security. However, to fully meet criterion 3 it is
necessary to be able to securely verify this digital signature, which
is discussed in more depth later.
Variants of EDH with digital-signatures underlie almost all
end-to-end encrypted instant messaging systems, as by definition
both communication partners are online during the conversation
and so can agree on keys. The same situation applies to voice and
video calls. However, for email and email-like systems where the
recipient is not necessarily online, EDH cannot be straightforwardly
used and so for OpenPGP and S/MIME the sender generates a
session encryption key and encrypts it to the recipient’s public key
then sends this with the message encrypted under the session key.
In this way end-to-end encryption is achieved. However, for this
approach to be secure the sender must ensure they have the right
public key for the recipient (and not that of a man-in-the-middle)
and also because discovering the recipient’s private key will allow
all past messages to be decrypted, this approach does not offer
forward secrecy.
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The design of MIKEY-SAKKE
Identities:
Initiator
Responder
Initiator’s network provider
Responder’s network provider
Digital signature
MIKEY Header
Random number
Timestamp
Encrypted key material
MIKEY-SAKKE mesage
Identity-based
decryption (SAKKE)
Identity-based digital
signature verication (ECCSI)
Session key derivation Session key
Figure 2: The MIKEY-SAKKE message
is sent from the initiator to responder.
The responder first checks the digital
signature on the message (using the
initiator’s public key), then decrypts
the key material (using the responder’s
private key). Finally, using the de-
crypted key material and other fields
in the message, the responder can
derive the session key.
MIKEY supports EDH but MIKEY-SAKKE works in a way much
closer to email encryption. The initiator of a call generates key
material, uses SAKKE to encrypt it to the other communication
partner (responder), and sends this message to the responder
during the set-up of the call – see Figure 2. However, SAKKE does
not require that the initiator discover the responder’s public key
because it uses identity-based encryption (IBE). In conventional
public key systems each party generates their own private key and
distributes their public key to anyone who needs it but in an IBE
system, all private keys are generated by the network provider
from their master private key. The MIKEY-SAKKE message is also
digitally signed to prevent tampering, using the Elliptic Curve-
Based Certificateless Signatures for ID-based encryption (ECCSI)15 15 Michael Groves, Elliptic Curve-Based
Certificateless Signatures for Identity-
Based Encryption (ECCSI), RFC 6507,
IETF, 2012
algorithm – another IBE algorithm.
Using the responder’s unique identity (e.g. email address or
phone number), and the network provider’s master public key, the
initiator can compute the responder’s public key and so encrypt
the key material. To obtain the session key the responder needs
to generate the initiator’s public key from the network provider’s
public key, and before the call occurred have asked the network
provider for the private key corresponding to their own identity.
Using these keys, the responder can check the message for tamper-
ing then recover the key material, and finally derive the session key.
While the network provider master key is valid for a long period,
users’ keys are valid for a month, so the network provider must
keep the master key permanently available, to allow new users to
join the network, and for existing users to periodically download
the current private key that corresponds to their identity.
MIKEY-SAKKE has the advantage that only one key-exchange
message is needed so call setup time is reduced compared to EDH.
It also moves the complexity of key distribution: in standard public
key systems the challenge is securely distributing public keys; in
IBE the challenge is securely distributing private keys. However,
IBE introduces fatal flaws for protocol security. Criterion 1 is met
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(calls are encrypted from initiator to responder) but criterion 2 is
not (the network provider generates the private key so can dis-
cover the session key and thus eavesdrop on calls). Criterion 3 fails
because if the network provider is compromised then an imper-
sonator could also know the responder’s private key. Criterion 4
also is not met because past communications can be decrypted if
the responder’s private key, or network provider’s master key, is
discovered.
The existence of a master private key that can decrypt all calls
past and present without detection, on a computer permanently
available, creates a huge security risk, and an irresistible target for
attackers. Also calls which cross different network providers (e.g.
between different companies) would be decrypted at a gateway
computer, creating another location where calls could be eaves-
dropped.
Criteria 5, 6 and 7 cannot be assessed because they apply to the
product rather than the algorithms the product uses, though here
MIKEY-SAKKE at least helps. The protocol is well documented as
an Internet standard, is reasonably simple, and has been externally
evaluated16 to some extent. Other security protocols like TLS have 16 Chloe Bell, Analysing MIKEY-SAKKE:
A Cryptographic Protocol for Secure
Multimedia Services, Master’s thesis,
Imperial College London, http:
//pubs.doc.ic.ac.uk/mobius-mikey-
sakke-analysis/mobius-mikey-
sakke-analysis.pdf, 2015
complex option-negotiation steps which offer future-proofing but
have probably been more a liability than asset17. MIKEY-SAKKE
17 Benjamin Beurdouche, et al., “A
Messy State of the Union: Taming the
Composite State Machines of TLS”, in
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
2015, pp. 535–552
fixes most cryptographic parameters to reasonable defaults. Prod-
ucts which implement MIKEY-SAKKE may not be open source, but
the GCHQ provided protocol implementation is. Products which
go through CPA assessment will be audited by GCHQ, though the
detailed audit report is not made publicly available.
The motivation behind MIKEY-SAKKE: key escrow
The MIKEY-SAKKE approach is not the only possible IBE approach:
equally IBE could digitally sign EDH key agreement messages.
Such as design would meet Criteria 1 and 4, though still not 3. Cri-
terion 2 would however be partially met because compromising the
network provider would only allow active man-in-the-middle at-
tacks and not passive eavesdropping, which substantially increases
the difficulty of carrying out attacks. In fact such a protocol has
been developed for voice encryption – Identity-Based Authenticated
Key Exchange (IBAKE) Mode of Key Distribution in Multimedia
Internet KEYing (MIKEY) – (MIKEY-IBAKE)18. 18 Violeta Cakulev and Ganapathy
Sundaram, MIKEY-IBAKE: Identity-
Based Authenticated Key Exchange
(IBAKE) Mode of Key Distribution in
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY),
RFC 6267, IETF, 2011
So this raises the question, why was MIKEY-SAKKE designed
this way and why are GCHQ not permitting the use of EDH based
voice encryption standards for UK government communications,
and not supporting the deployment of such protocols elsewhere,
despite their superior security? It certainly cannot be attributed
to incompetence. GCHQ have extremely capable staff and the
discovery that they had built the ability to eavesdrop on all Internet
communications transiting the UK19 demonstrates their technical 19 Ewen MacAskill, et al., “GCHQ
taps fibre-optic cables for secret
access to world’s communications”,
The Guardian, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/
21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa
skills. Therefore, there must be other design criteria behind MIKEY-
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SAKKE, or that the design follows culturally-held beliefs embedded
in GCHQ about how protocols should work.
Although the words are never used in the specification, MIKEY-
SAKKE supports key escrow. That is, if the network provider is
served with a warrant or is hacked into it is possible to recover
responder private keys and so decrypt past calls without the legiti-
mate communication partners being able to detect this happening.
Secure Chorus facilitates undetectable mass surveillance, in a way
that EDH based key encryption schemes would not. This is pre-
sented as a feature rather than bug, with the motivating case in the
GCHQ documentation being to allow companies to listen to their
employees calls when investigating misconduct20, such as in the 20 CESG, “Using MIKEY-SAKKE:
Building secure multimedia services”,
White paper, 2014, https://www.cesg.
gov.uk/white-papers/using-mikey-
sakke-building-secure-multimedia-
services
financial industry.
The aim of GCHQ’s development of MIKEY-SAKKE – to weaken
security of in order to facilitate surveillance – is made clear through
their activity on the 3GPP standardisation committee responsible
for “Lawful Interception (LI)”: ensuring that law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are able to eavesdrop on 4G cellphone calls.
The National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC), the part of
GCHQ responsible for assisting law enforcement and intelligence
agencies with decryption and data analysis, sits on this committee
(known as the “3GPP SA3 LI”) and their representative served as
secretary.
GCHQ’s submission to the committee21 provides an analysis of 21 NTAC, “LI of MIKEY-IBAKE, a UK
perspective”, Report to 3GPP TSG-SA
WG3-LI Meeting 38 (SA3LI10_099),
2010, https://cryptome.org/2014/03/
nsa-uk-mikey-ibake.pdf
MIKEY-IBAKE and points out the security features which result
from its use of EDH – forward security and resistance to passive
eavesdropping – are incompatible with their requirements of al-
lowing large scale undetectable surveillance, both from a technical
and legal perspective. Consequently GCHQ requested that MIKEY-
IBAKE should not be used, stating:
“In light of these requirements, UK government has developed
a similar scheme, MIKEY-SAKKE, which supports 3GPP SA3 LI
requirements and has additional benefits such as low latency.”
In 2012, Alcatel-Lucent and Rogers Wireless proposed an al-
ternative and more covert key-escrow approach to the same com-
mittee: deliberately weakening the random-number generation in
the MIKEY-IBAKE EDH exchange22 rather than replacing it with 22 Christopher Parsons, “The Gov-
ernance of Telecommunications
Surveillance: How Opaque and
Unaccountable Practices and Poli-
cies Threaten Canadians”, Tele-
com Transparency Project, 2015,
https://www.telecomtransparency.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
Governance-of-Telecommunications-
Surveillance-Final.pdf
MIKEY-SAKKE.
Another way that MIKEY-SAKKE diverges from other secure
instant messaging and phone systems is that there is no attempt
to protect the identity of the communication partners, only the call
content. In this way an eavesdropper can build up social network
maps showing who is communicating with whom, when and how
often, even if anonymising technology is used. This “metadata” is
often more sensitive than the content – General Michael Hayden,
former director of the US National Security Agency (NSA) stated
“we kill people based on metadata”23. The design is not an accident 23 David Cole, “We Kill People Based
on Metadata”, The New York Review
of Books, 2014, http://www.nybooks.
com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-
people-based-metadata/
– the GCHQ documentation states “MIKEY-SAKKE is an enterprise-
level solution where anonymity is not possible”.
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Implications of protocol design
Key-escrow is an approach for building back-doors into encryption
systems promoted by the NSA in the early 1990s and built into the
Clipper encryption device24. With Clipper, a normal key exchange 24 https://www.epic.org/crypto/
clipper/algorithm would be performed, but the resulting session key would
also be encrypted under a separate escrow key held by a special
department of the US government (the escrow agent). A third party
wishing to listen to an eavesdropped encrypted call would request
that the escrow agent decrypt the escrowed session key, and so
allow the call to be decrypted. The escrow agent would only allow
use of the escrow key after verifying legal authorisation and would
keep records of such requests for oversight audits. After strong
opposition from civil liberties groups, scientists and politicians the
proposals were dropped by the NSA.
Figure 3: The AT&T TSD-3600E: one
voice encryption product based around
the Clipper chip. (Photo: Matt Blaze)
MIKEY-SAKKE allows third-party access to encrypted conver-
sations in a different manner (sometimes its approach is called
“key recovery” rather than “key escrow”). Firstly, the capability
of a third party being able to decrypt past calls is integral to the
MIKEY-SAKKE key-exchange process so is harder to bypass. One
flaw in the Clipper protocol was that someone could use the chip
to encrypt calls but prevent the escrowed key from being usable25, 25 Matt Blaze, “Protocol Failure in
the Escrowed Encryption Standard”,
in ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 1994,
pp. 59–67
and such behaviour would not be possible to detect unless the es-
crow facility were actually used. Secondly, the control over access
to recovered keys is different. In Clipper, the ability to decrypt
escrowed keys would be with a government agency, possibly under
joint control, and any use would be audited. With MIKEY-SAKKE,
access to private keys would be provided by companies operating
communication networks, and so may be more vulnerable to hack-
ing, intimidation of employees or insider abuse, as well as allowing
less oversight.
MIKEY-SAKKE is not the first attempt by GCHQ to promote a
key exchange protocol that facilitates key escrow – the 1996 GCHQ
protocol26 differs in the detail (particularly as it pre-dates the 26 Ross Anderson and Michael Roe,
“The GCHQ Protocol and its Prob-
lems”, in International Conference on the
Theory and Application of Cryptographic
Techniques (EUROCRYPT), 1997, pp.
134–148
SAKKE encryption algorithm by four years) but is similar in its
characteristics. Like MIKEY-SAKKE, the GCHQ protocol is based
on IBE, and private keys are distributed by a central authority who
can then also decrypt eavesdropped messages. A notable difference
however is that while the GCHQ protocol was explicitly stated to
support key escrow to facilitate law enforcement and intelligence
agency access, this controversial aspect has not been included in the
description of MIKEY-SAKKE and instead the efficiency over EDH
is emphasised.
This recurrence of key-escrow proposals from GCHQ is not sur-
prising, given the conflict of interest inherent in making one agency
responsible for both spying on communications and preventing
spying. GCHQ designs the encryption technology used by govern-
ment to prevent unauthorised parties having access to classified
information. But GCHQ also wants the ability to examine how
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this encryption technology is used to investigate suspected leaks
whether to companies, the press, or foreign intelligence agencies.
Where the situation becomes more complex is when encryp-
tion technology used by companies is deliberately weakened in
order to facilitate surveillance, and these weaknesses are then
exploited by others. One such case is the recent news that the Dual-
EC DRBG cryptographic random number generator in Juniper’s
network equipment, almost certainly designed as a back-door
for the NSA27 (which Juniper tried to close) but was later modi- 27 Daniel J. Bernstein, et al., Dual
EC: A Standardized Back Door, Report
2015/767, Cryptology ePrint Archive,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/767,
2015
fied to give access to someone else28. As the Juniper case and the
28 Matthew Green, “On the Juniper
backdoor”, blog post, 2015, http://
blog.cryptographyengineering.com/
2015/12/on-juniper-backdoor.html
development of MIKEY-SAKKE shows, the increasing use of com-
mercial software for securing government communications, and
government-supported security software for securing commer-
cial communications, makes it difficult to predict the wide-scale
implications of design changes promoted by intelligence agencies.
Protocols like MIKEY-SAKKE also raise broader questions.
Phillip Rogaway argues that cryptography is not politically neu-
tral 29, and so has moral dimensions as well as presenting intellec- 29 Phillip Rogaway, “The Moral Char-
acter of Cryptographic Work”,
Essay to accompany 2015 IACR
Distinguished Lecture, 2015,
http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/
~rogaway/papers/moral-fn.pdf
tually stimulating puzzles for mathematicians. Cryptography has
the capability of re-arranging power, and certain designs have fun-
damentally different characteristics. On Identity Based Encryption,
Rogaway notes “one can easily see the authoritarian tendency built
into IBE”.
In fact, the implications of having centralised authorities who
have the ability to break communication users’ security goes further
than just raising questions about privacy of communications. In
“Do Artifacts have Politics”30, Langdon Winner shows that the de- 30 Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have
Politics?”, Daedalus, 109, 1980, pp.
121–136
sign of some physical artifacts either requires or at least encourages
particular social structures of power and authority. One example he
gives is civilian nuclear power: because of the incredible damage
which could come from a terrorist obtaining just a tiny amount of
nuclear material, it would be considered necessary to put in place
widespread surveillance and other intrusions on civil liberties to
impose strict safeguards. In this way a technical artefact such as nu-
clear power can have deep and unavoidable political ramifications.
Building inherently fragile communications security systems also
naturally leads to certain political structures. Where a compromised
network provider would give an attacker the ability to undetectably
decrypt any message both past and future, the justification for ex-
traordinary effort (and budget) to protect these systems naturally
follows. Not only must there be strong assurance that the critical
aspects of the network provider work correctly, but also that net-
work surveillance be put in place to detect and prevent such attacks.
Background checks on employees, and strict secrecy over how secu-
rity mechanisms work also seem likely. These impositions on civil
liberties will have further implications than just the protection of
the systems they were intended for.
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Towards secure voice communications
Robust communication security systems avoid the single-point
of failure of having centralised weak-points, such as the network
provider in MIKEY-SAKKE-based encryption systems. EDH key-
agreement gives most of the properties required, and is imple-
mented for voice communications in the Secure Communications
Interoperability Protocol (SCIP)31 and Z Real-time Transport Pro- 31 https://www.iad.gov/SecurePhone/
tocol (ZTRP)32, among others. SCIP was developed in the NSA so 32 Philip Zimmermann, et al., ZRTP:
Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast
Secure RTP, RFC 6189, IETF, 2011
is mainly used for government applications and ZRTP is mainly in
civilian applications. The MIKEY-SAKKE design documentation
explicitly states that these protocols were not able to meet GCHQ’s
“scale and usability requirements”33, but does not expand on this 33 CESG, “Secure Voice at OFFICIAL”,
White paper, 2015, http://www.cesg.
gov.uk/guidance/secure-voice-
official
claim.
One voice encryption application which ticks all the boxes is
Signal34 (formerly RedPhone) from Open Whisper Systems. Using 34 https://whispersystems.org/
ZRTP means that it is end-to-end encrypted (criteria 1 and 2) and
offers forward security (criterion 4) – see Table 1. Its design and
code are available for audit (criteria 5 and 6), and it has fared
well to examination35 (criterion 7). Resisting man-in-the-middle 35 Matthew Green, “Here come the en-
cryption apps!”, blog post, 2013, http:
//blog.cryptographyengineering.
com/2013/03/here-come-encryption-
apps.html
attacks (criterion 3) is the most challenging requirement as it either
forces the user to rely on the security of third parties or carry
out their own checks. For this reason, the major differentiating
factor between voice encryption schemes is how these checks are
performed.
1) 
En
cry
pte
d
2) 
Pro
vid
er-
saf
e
3) 
Ve
ri
ed
 id
en
tity
4) 
Fo
rw
ard
-se
cu
re
MIKEY-SAKKE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
MIKEY-IBAKE ✓ partial ✗ ✓
ZRTP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Comparison of three protocols
against the EFF criteria.
Signal, in common with other ZRTP-based designs, uses Short
Authentication Strings where not only does the EDH key-agreement
result in a session key but also a 16 bit value which is converted
into two words which are shown on the screen. One caller must
read out the words, and if there is no man-in-the-middle, there is
only one EDH exchange, so the other caller will see that they match.
However this is not foolproof: the callers must follow the procedure
exactly and even then it’s vulnerable to an attacker impersonating
the voice of the other caller36. 36 Maliheh Shirvanian and Nitesh
Saxena, “Wiretapping via Mimicry:
Short Voice Imitation Man-in-the-
Middle Attacks on Crypto Phones”,
in ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2014,
pp. 868–879
Signal’s instant message encryption facility (formerly TextSecure)
offers another approach to preventing man-in-the-middle attacks:
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allow callers to meet in person before calling, and verifying that
the “fingerprint” of the other caller’s long-term public key matches
what they expect. This same approach could be applied to voice
encryption too. Moreover, Signal’s instant message facility uses
a variant of EDH – Axolotl – which offers forward security even
when one party is offline. This facility could be used for end-to-end
encrypted voicemail, which is one of GCHQ’s motivating cases for
why to use MIKEY-SAKKE rather than EDH in standard MIKEY.
While cryptographically sound, experience with other applica-
tions has shown that manual fingerprint verification is hard for
non-experts to perform and as a result has been hidden in a part
of the Signal user-interface where only determined experts will
find it. This is an example of another aspect where the authors of
Signal have put great effort: making difficult choices to help make
the software easy to use and so have widespread use.
Although not one of the EFF criteria, encouraging widespread
use of cryptographic tools is also a security advantage. If encrypted
messaging is rare, those who use it could be singled out for attack,
whether harassment of the person or hacking of their computer.
Good usability is necessary to achieve this goal: if secure calls are
much harder to make than insecure ones, few people will bother
and those who do may expend so much effort struggling with the
software that they will not have enough attention remaining to
detect man-in-the-middle attacks.
Also necessary for widespread use is the ability to discover
which contacts support which secure voice standard, and obtaining
the contacts’ public keys. Signal uses people’s phone numbers as an
identifier and has a central service which allows people to discover
which people in their phone’s contact database also have Signal.
This centralisation is great for usability but does put Signal users’
metadata somewhat at risk37. Meta-data protection, both for contact 37 Moxie Marlinspike, “The Difficulty
Of Private Contact Discovery”, blog
post, 2014, https://whispersystems.
org/blog/contact-discovery/
discovery and calls, in large-scale networks is a difficult and as yet
unsolved problem.
Preventing Man-in-the-Middle attacks
There are other options available for man-in-the-middle resistance.
Key-continuity, also known as Trust On First Use (TOFU) relies
on the fact that while man-in-the-middle attacks are possible they
are hard to perform consistently as a user moves between different
networks. In TOFU-based schemes the first public key used by a
contact is stored, and any change of this key is flagged up to the
user as being cause for suspicion that a man-in-the-middle attack
has started (or stopped). Secure Shell (SSH) popularised this model
and another ZRTP implementation – Silent Phone38 – uses this in 38 https://www.silentcircle.com/
addition to Short Authentication Strings.
For HTTPS encrypted web browsing the Certification Authori-
ties (CA) system is intended to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
The same system is used for S/MIME encrypted email and could
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equally be applied to encrypted phone calls. CAs are organisations
which certify that a particular public key corresponds to a partic-
ular name (e.g. domain name or email address). This approach is
convenient for the users because their web browser does all the
checking for them, but a malicious or compromised CA can harm
users so they become tempting targets for attack. In 2011 two certi-
fication authorities were compromised39 by hackers affiliated with 39 Eva Galperin, et al., “A Post Mortem
on the Iranian DigiNotar Attack”, blog
post, 2011, https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2011/09/post-mortem-
iranian-diginotar-attack
or supporting the Iranian government. Preventing such attacks is
difficult but Certificate Transparency40 aims to help detect such
40 http://www.certificate-
transparency.org/
attacks quickly to allow better mitigation.
OpenPGP encrypted email implements an extension of key
fingerprint verification, called the Web of Trust where users not
only check their contacts’ key fingerprints but can also choose
to rely on checks that those contacts perform on their contacts,
and so on. Because who is a contact of whom becomes publicly
visible, this is a disaster for metadata protection, and the OpenPGP
web of trust database is now built into tools for covert intelligence
gathering41. For this reason and for usability reasons, I am not 41 https://www.paterva.com/
optimistic about using the Web of Trust for secure phone calls and
even for email the leading OpenPGP implementation, GnuPG now
implements TOFU42. 42 Neal H. Walfield, “TOFU for
GnuPG”, Email, 2015, https:
//lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-
users/2015-October/054608.html
A final method for man-in-the-middle protection is used by
the OTR (Off the Record) instant messaging protocol43, but could
43 Nikita Borisov, et al., “Off-the-Record
Communication, or, Why Not To Use
PGP”, in ACM Workshop on Privacy
in Electronic Society (WPES), 2004, pp.
77–84
equally be applied to secure voice communication. Here the com-
munication partners agree on a short password (perhaps by meet-
ing in person), or work out a question to which only the legitimate
partner will know the correct answer. This password or question-
and-answer is combined with the EDH key exchange, such that it
is not possible for an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle44 44 Chris Alexander and Ian Goldberg,
“Improved User Authentication in
Off-the-Record Messaging”, in ACM
Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society
(WPES), 2007, pp. 41–47
without knowing the secret information.
Supporting investigation of misconduct
None of the ZRTP-based implementations I’ve mentioned supports
key escrow, but for some niche applications third-party access to en-
crypted calls may be necessary. The MIKEY-SAKKE documentation
suggests the regulated financial industry is one such case, but in
reality what they need is quite different from what MIKEY-SAKKE
offers. MIKEY-SAKKE means that encrypted calls that are recorded
can be decrypted indefinitely into the future, because the network
provider has a long term private key from which all user keys can
be generated. This is not what the financial industry wants, firstly
because they require not only that recorded calls are kept for the
legally mandated time, but also that they are permanently deleted
immediately after this period. Secondly, key escrow is only useful if
the encrypted calls are recorded as a matter of course, and financial
companies don’t do this.
For these reasons it is better to build regulatory-mandated call-
recording systems on top of secure phone systems and record the
insecure by design: protocols for encrypted phone calls 14
calls before they are encrypted, or after they are decrypted on the
other side. Indeed, this is how today’s products for call-recording in
the financial industry work45 and there’s no reason to change. 45 “Vodafone Mobile Voice Recording”,
http://www.vodafone.com/business/
global-enterprise/enterprise-
managed-mobility/mobile-voice-
recording
Financial companies don’t have perfect security, so having a
server permanently available storing the master private key for
all their communications is a huge risk, but unavoidable with
MIKEY-SAKKE. If call-recording uses separate mechanisms to
end-to-end encryption the call-recording key can be kept offline
and only used in the exceptional circumstances of investigating
suspected misconduct. In this way recordings could also be deleted
when there is no regulatory or business reason to keep them, and
at that point anyone who has eavesdropped on the encrypted
call would not be able to decrypt them either (due to forward
secrecy). It is also advisable for the financial industry to use the
same applications as other people, and use products that protect
metadata, because being singled out as a rich banker puts staff at
risk if they are in countries where kidnapping is a problem.
Conclusions and future work
The design of MIKEY-SAKKE is motivated by the desire to allow
undetectable and unauditable mass surveillance, which may be a
requirement in exceptional scenarios such as within government
departments processing classified information. However, in the
vast majority of cases the properties that MIKEY-SAKKE offers are
actively harmful for security. It creates a vulnerable single point of
failure, which would require huge effort, skill and cost to secure
– requiring resource beyond the capability of most companies.
Better options for voice encryption exist today, though they are
not perfect either. In particular, more work is needed on providing
scalable and usable protection against man-in-the-middle attacks,
and protection of metadata for contact discovery and calls. More
broadly, designers of protocols and systems need to appreciate the
ethical consequences of their actions in terms of the political and
power structures which naturally follow from their use. MIKEY-
SAKKE is the latest example to raise questions over the policy of
many governments, including the UK, to put intelligence agencies
in charge of protecting companies and individuals from spying,
given the conflict of interest it creates.
An edited version of this article appears in the March 2016 special
edition of IEEE Computer Magazine: Communications and Privacy
under Surveillance (S. J. Murdoch, “Insecure by Design: Protocols for
Encrypted Phone Calls,” in Computer, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 25–33, Mar.
2016. doi:10.1109/MC.2016.70).
© 2016 Steven J. Murdoch. This work is licensed under
a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
License. Typeset using Tufte-LATEX.
